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Chapter 1
Introduction
When the term of a game is said, many readers will probably imagine a poker
game, the chess or some computer game for example. All of these popular games
have something in common. It is the situation where players are making decisions
and simultaneously are influencing decisions of other players in order to win. This
general decision-making situation is the basis of the term a game in the game
theory. In this elementary sense, we are playing games more often than we in fact
realize. We are playing a game every time we get in an interaction with other
people and try to make for ourselves the best decisions.
In context of this interpretation, a player in the game theory is anyone or
anything that is able to make decisions. Hence it does not have to be only
human, but also an animal, a company or an institution for example. In every
game the decision-maker has at disposal some strategies he can choose. Now, the
reader is probably imagining some ways or methods which lead to the win. Such
reader is not far from the truth. In the game theory, player’s strategies are all
decisions that are available to him in the moment of his decision-taking. It is
common in games that each player can clasify strategies. He is able to determine
which strategy is more or less helpful for him. Hence there is defined some
evaluation function. This function has several names, for example cost function,
utility function, payoff function and others and it is matter of taste which one is
used.
One of the important ingredients of the game theory is a concept of game
equilibria. It is a problem of searching stable points, which mean situations
players can occur in and which are in some sense stable. One type of such points
is a Nash equilibrium. It is named after mathematician John Forbes Nash who
won the John Von Neumann Theory Prize in 1978 for this contribution to the
game theory. This point is stable in sense that no player wants to change his
strategies on his own because any deviation would make him worse off.
In examinations of such equilibrium points there are often made some simpli-
fying assumptions about evaluation functions which help to make these problems
easier to solve. The purpose of this work is to examine impacts of such assump-
tions on an existence and calculating Nash equilibria. We chose several of such
common assumptions. They are linearity, piecewise linearity and (strict) concav-
ity.
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Chapter 2
Game Theory
Suppose we have a set of N players. For every player i let us define a set of
strategies Si ∈ R, i = 1, . . . , N . Then S = S1× ...×SN denotes a set of strategies
of all players. The strategy selected (played) by player i will be denoted si ∈ Si.
Let fi : S → R be a real-valued function of N variables. Function fi will be called
a payoff function of player i and its value will represent a payoff of player i if all
players choose a vector of strategies (s1, ..., sN) ∈ S.
Definition 1. The game in normal (strategic) form is defined as the triplet
({1, ..., N}, S, f), where the set {1, ..., N} represents a set of N players, S is a
set of strategies of all players and f = (f1, ..., fN) is an N -dimensional real-
valued function f : S → RN where fi is a payoff function of player i for every
i ∈ {1, ..., N}.
A payoff function associates strategies with utilities gained by a player in
a game and hence it sets preference relations on the set of strategies. These
preference relations differing from player to player are described by the following
definition.
Definition 2. We will say that vector of strategies (s1, ..., sN) is at least as good
as (s
′
1, ..., s
′
N) to Player i if and only if
fi(s1, ..., sN) ≥ fi(s
′
1, ..., s
′
N).
Further, we will say that Player i prefers a vector of strategies (s1, ..., sN) to
(s
′
1, ..., s
′
N) if and only if
fi(s1, ..., sN) > fi(s
′
1, ..., s
′
N).
To be able to make any conclusions we need to know players’ behavior in
games or at least to expect some. Hence there is a general assumption about
players’ behavior made in the game theory which is believed to describe reality
closely. It is the assumption of rationality.
Definition 3. We say that Player i behaves rationally (is being rational) if he
chooses a vector of strategies s = (s1, ..., sN) ∈ S while there is no other available
vector of strategies t = (t1, ..., tN) ∈ S which could be preffered to s.
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We will suppose in the following that all players behave rationally. Clearly
from definition, player i behaves rationally if and only if he chooses such vector
of strategies that maximizes his payoff function.
Now let us give a general classification of games used in the literature which
is mainly according to the properties of the triplet ({1, ..., N}, S, f):
• Size of the set of players: When having N players we generally talk about
N-person games.
• Cardinality of the set S: When number of element of S is finite, we talk
about finite games. Otherwise games are called infinite or continuous.
• Relation between players’ payoffs: When
N∑
i=1
fi(s1, . . . , sN) = 0
holds, we talk about zero-sum games, otherwise they are called nonzero-
sum.
• Cooperation between players: If players are allowed to cooperate, i.e. to
change information during a game, we say that they play a cooperative
game. In the other case the game is called non-cooperative.
• Repetition of a game: If a game is played only once which means that
players chooses their strategies only once, we call this game static. If a
game is repeated we call it a dynamic game.
In the center of focus of this work there are N -person static non-cooperative
nonzero-sum games, both finite and continuous. The other types of games are
not in our interest and hence we omit their proper description.
In the following sections we give a brief introduction to finite and continuous
games.
2.1 Finite Games
Let us have a finite set of strategies
Si = {s1, . . . , smi}, mi ∈ R,
for every i ∈ {1, ..., N}.
Suppose that every strategy from the set {s1, . . . , smi} is chosen by player i with
some probability. Then to every set Si we can assign a vector
pi = (pi1, . . . , p
i
mi
),
where pij is a probability of choosing strategy sj by player i and
mi∑
k=1
pik = 1.
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Definition 4. A vector pi is called a mixed strategy of player i in finite games.
If there exists k ∈ {1, ...,mi} such that p
i
k = 1, then we say that player i plays a
pure strategy.
If player plays pure strategy, he chooses a single strategy, whereas if he plays
a mixed strategy, he chooses the probabilities with which he plays all his strate-
gies. Now, the reader might be convinced that playing mixed strategy could be
more advantageous than playing pure strategy. If a player plays a pure strategy,
opponents could discover it and profit from this information or, moreover, play
strategies that would be harmful for this player. On the other hand if player plays
mixed strategy, he protects himself from discovering his played strategy since he
does not know it himself. However, let us understand that the game would have
to repeat so that opponents could discover player’s pure strategy. Moreover, there
are games where player does not care anyway if opponents know his strategy. It
is for example the case where players maximize their payoffs independently on
strategies of their opponents.
Since this work is interested in static games where strategies of players are
not known to their opponents, we focus on pure strategies.
Let us return to finite games in general. There are two most common repre-
sentations which help to model finite games. In the rest of this section we give
an overview of them.
The matrix form is a representation used for 2-person finite games. It is based
on an (m1 ×m2)-dimensional matrix
A = {(aij, bij)}i=1,...,m1
j=1,...,m2
,
with elements (aij, bij), where aij and bij are payoffs of player 1 and player 2 if
player 1 chooses strategy si and player 2 chooses strategy sj.
In the Example 1 we show a game in the matrix form and, moreover, we de-
scribe player’s rational behavior.
Example 1:
Suppose we have two players. For the purpose of this example and other
examples in this chapter player 1 will be called Kane and player 2 will be called
Loli. They are playing a game with a finite set of strategies represented by the
following matrix form.
Loli
Kane
(1,6) (2,2) (3,5)
(4,5) (5,4) (6,2)
(3,4) (7,5) (3,6)
The strategies of Kane are rows {1, 2, 3}, the strategies of Loli are columns
{1, 2, 3}.
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Let us illustrate, what Loli’s rational behavior means. If Kane chooses row 1,
Loli will choose a column that would lead to her maximum payoff. In this case
it is column 1 and her payoff will be 6. If Kane chooses row 2, Loli will choose
again column 1 and her payoff will be 5. If Kane chooses row 3, Loli will choose
column 3 and her payoff will be again 6. Loli will never choose column 2 because
she would not behave rational.
△
The extensive form is a representation used for N -person games in general.
It is based on a tree structure where roots are positions of players before their
move and branches represent strategies available in that position (root). This
representation is suitable for dynamic games because of its ability to illustrate
sequences of players’ moves in time.
A game in an extensive form is illustrated in the following example.
Example 2: (Battle of Sexes)
Kane and Loli want to spend an evening together. Kane would like to go to
the car-racing whereas Loli would like to go to the theatre. They did not see each
other for a whole day and have no possibility to let each other know where they
decided to go. However, Kane knows that Loli wanted to go to the theatre and
Loli knows that Kane wanted to go to the car-racing. Now, both of them have
to decide where to go.
Let us suppose that their payoffs are evaluated as follows:
• If they decide to go on different places, both will be disappointed and their
payoffs will be 0.
• If both decide to go to the car-racing, Kane will be happy and his payoff
will be 10. Loli will be glad that she will have met Kane but not as happy
as she would be at the theatre with him and her payoff will be 5.
• If both decide to go to the theatre, Loli will be happy and her payoff will
be 10 whereas Kane’s payoff will be just 5.
We can illustrate this game in the following extensive form.
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Figure 2.1: Battle of Sexes
Loli does not know where Kane has gone. Hence she does not know her
exact position (root) she is occurring in. (In the Figure 1.1 these two roots are
illustrated tied together.) If Loli would know where Kane has gone, she would
know her position and also which subtree she should choose. In this situation she
would always make the same choice as Kane because it is rational behavior for
her. This game is generally known as Battle of Sexes.
△
2.2 Continuous Games
In continuous games player i chooses from an infinite set of strategies Si. In the
beginning of this chapter we defined Si as a subset of R. Si are often considered
to be convex in the game theory and we will make this assumption as well. Hence
we will represent them by convex intervals from R.
In general, there need not be any restrictions on payoff functions in continuous
games. However, in the next chapter we make an assumption of continuity.
Although we said that pure strategies are in our interest, for completeness we
define also mixed strategies in continuous games. Hence, we need to define some
representation which would describe a probability to every point from Si.
Definition 5. The probability measure µi on Si is called a mixed strategy of
Player i in continuous games.
In the next chapter we will omit finite games and focus on continuous games.
It is because impacts of assumptions about payoff function are more interesting
to examine on infinite convex sets of strategies.
In the center of this work there are impacts on an existence and finding so-
called Nash equilibria. The concept of Nash equilibria is introduced in the fol-
lowing section as well as one other type of equilibrium points, so called Pareto
optima.
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2.3 Equilibria
The concept of equilibrium points given in this section is generally same for finite
and continuous games.
For simplicity let us denote by s−i ∈ R
N−1 a vector (s1, . . . , si−1, si+1, . . . , sN)
for every i ∈ {1, . . . , N} . It means that s−i is a vector of strategies of all players
except of player i.
Further denote by
S−i :=
N
X
j=1
j 6=i
Sj
a set of all strategies of all players except of player i.
Definition 6. Define a value function fMi : S−i → R subsequently:
fMi (s−i) := sup
si∈Si
fi(si, s−i)
for every i ∈ {1, . . . , N}.
Value of function fMi determines the maximum payoff which Player i can get
if other players play a vector of strategies s−i.
Definition 7. Define a set Ci(s−i) subsequently:
Ci(s−i) := {si ∈ Si | fi(si, s−i) = f
M
i (s−i)}
for every i ∈ {1, . . . , N}. Then Ci(s−i) is called the optimal response set or the
rational reaction set of player i. If Ci(s−i) is singleton for every vector s−i, then
it is called the reaction curve of player i.
According to Definition 7, Ci(s−i) can be understood as a set of all strategies
of player i which lead to the maximum payoff of player i while other players
choose a vector of strategies s−i.
Definition 8. A vector of strategies s¯ = (s¯1, . . . , s¯N) is called a Nash equilibrium
if it holds
s¯i ∈ Ci(s¯−i)
for every i ∈ {1, . . . , N}.
Let us note that it holds that s¯i ∈ Ci(s¯−i) if and only if
fi(s¯i, s¯−i) = f
M
i (s¯−i) = sup
si∈Si
fi(si, s¯−i).
Hence a vector of strategies s¯ is a Nash equilibrium if a strategy played by
every player leads to his maximum possible payoff when the strategies of other
players are fixed. Nash equilibrium is a stable point of a game in sense that no
player wants to deviate from his strategy on his own because he would not better
himself. It is also called a non-cooperative equilibrium of a game. However, let us
mention that it doesn’t have to be necessarily a point such that players could not
better themselves by changing strategies of more than one player, for example by
cooperating in choosing their strategies. In other words, it does not have to be
so-called Pareto optimal. Pareto optimum is another equilibrium point of games.
Let us see the next definition.
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Definition 9. A vector of strategies s˜ = (s˜1, . . . , s˜N) is called Pareto optimal if
there exists no vector t = (t1, . . . , tN), t 6= s, such that
fi(t) ≥ fi(s˜), for every i ∈ {1, . . . , N},
and simultaneously
fj(t) > fj(s˜), for some j ∈ {1, . . . , N}.
Pareto optimum is a point where no player can better himself without another
player getting worse off it. This point can be found as an equilibrium point in
cooperative games if players maximize a sum of their payoffs. However, there
can be many Pareto optima in cooperative games but not every one has to be an
equilibrium point in sense that not every one has to maximize a sum of players’
payoffs. To learn more about cooperative games or Pareto optima, reader can see
[1] and [2].
Now let us return to the concept of Nash equilibria. Let us denote by
C : (s1, ..., sN) 7→ (C1(s−1), ..., CN(s−N))
a mapping which assigns to every vector of strategies the optimal response sets
of all players. Clearly, a Nash equilibrium is a fixed point of mapping C. Let us
remind that s¯ is a fixed point of mapping C if it holds that s¯ ∈ C(s¯).
Hence the existence of a Nash equilibrium is equivalent to the existence of
a fixed point. This leads us to the necessity of an application of fixed-point
theorems. We will introduced two of the most used ones.
Theorem 1 (Brouwer’s Fixed-Point). If K is a compact and convex subset of a
finite-dimensional space and C : K → K is a continuous mapping, then C has a
fixed point, i.e. there exists k ∈ K such that C(k) = k.
Theorem 2 (Kakutani’s Fixed-Point). If K is a compact and convex subset of
a finite-dimensional space and C : K → K is an upper semicontinuous mapping,
which assigns to each k ∈ K a nonempty, closed, convex subset of K, then C has
a fixed point.
There is a very important conclusion in the game theory based on fixed-point
theorem. The author of this theorem is J. F. Nash.
Theorem 3. Every N-person finite game has a Nash equilibrium in mixed strate-
gies.
Proof. The statement follows from Theorem 1.4.1.
Fixed point theorems are useful tools for proving an existence of Nash equi-
libria in games. However, they do not provide any instruction how to calculate
them.
From Definition 8 it follows clearly that Nash equilibria can be found as in-
tersection points of the optimal response sets of all players.
Let us note that
Ci(s−i) = {ti ∈ Si | fi(ti, s−i) = sup
si∈Si
fi(si, s−i)} = {arg sup
si∈Si
fi(si, s−i)}.
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One convenient way of finding such sets is to let the players optimize their
own criterions assuming that strategies of their opponent are fixed. Hence we
need to introduce the functions
fMi (s¯−i) = sup
si∈Si
fi(si, s¯−i)
for every player i and further, Nash equilibria can be found as solutions of fol-
lowing equations
fi(s¯i, s¯−i) = f
M
i (s¯−i), i = 1, ..., N.
As a conclusion of this section, we summarize three cases which we will dis-
tinguish in the next chapter.
1. Nash equilibrium does not exist.
2. There exists exactly one Nash equilibrium.
3. There exist more than one Nash equilibria.
The following example illustrates computation of both Nash equilibria and
Pareto optima in 2-person finite game.
Example 3: (Prisoner’s dilemma)
Kane and Loli have been arrested by the police. However, there is not enough
evidence against them so they are interrogated separately. Kane and Loli have
two choices, to keep quiet (Q) or to report against their partner (R). Police will
judge them according to the following scheme:
• If both will keep quiet, police will lock them up both in prison for 1 month.
• If one will keep quiet while the second one will report, the informer will be
free and the quiet one will be locked up in prison for 10 month.
• If both of them will report agains each other, both will be locked up in
prison for 5 month.
This game can be illustrated by the following matrix form.
Loli
Kane
Q R
Q (-1,-1) (-10,0)
R (0,-10) (-5,-5)
Let us denote by C1 the optimal response set of Kane and by C2 the optimal
response set of Loli.
Clearly
C1(S) = {R},
C1(R) = {R},
C2(S) = {R},
C2(R) = {R}.
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We can see that for both players, Kane and Loli, it is more profitable to report
against their partner no matter which strategy their partner chooses.
Since Nash equilibria can be found as intersection points of these sets, clearly,
there is only one Nash equilibrium in this game. It is a vector (R,R).
This point, however, is not Pareto optimal since both players can better them-
selves by deviating from their strategies. According to Definition 9, points (R, S),
(S,R) and (S, S) are the only Pareto optima in this game.
This example shows that Nash equilibrium does not have to be the vector of
strategies that leads to the best outcome of the game in sense of maximizing a
total payoff of all players.
This game is generally called Prisoner’s dilemma in the literature.
△
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Chapter 3
Payoff Functions and Finding
Nash Equilibria
In this chapter we assume the set of strategies Si ∈ R to be nonempty and convex
for every i = 1, ..., N . Hence we represent it by an interval from R. For simplicity
we will distinguish two different cases, closed and bounded positive intervals of
real numbers [ai, bi], ai, bi > 0, and the intervals of all real numbers (−∞,∞).
Other types of subsets are not considered in this work since we are not interested
in them.
Additional assumption we make in this chapter concerns payoff functions. We
will suppose them to be continuous and differentiable.
Although payoff functions of players are of N variables, players are not able
to determine values of all variables on their own. They make decisions about
the only one - their own strategy. All of the other variables are of other players’
choice. Hence when calculating Nash equilibria we solve optimization problem of
every player separately considering all strategies except of player’s own strategy
to be given parameters.
3.1 Affine Linear Games
Suppose we have a game of N players, where every Player i, i = 1, ..., N , has an
affine linear continuous payoff function fi(si, s−i) on a nonempty convex set of
strategies S.
We will call such game affine linear game (AL game).
In the following we will search Nash equilibria on two different types of strate-
gies as discussed above. Firstly, we will consider the set of strategies to be com-
pact.
A) Suppose that S = [a1, b1]× ...× [aN , bN ] ⊂ R
N
+ .
From Theorem A.3 (see Appendix A) it follows that there exist coefficients
αi1, ..., α
i
N , β
i ∈ R such that affine linear payoff function fi(si, s−i) can be ex-
pressed by the following form:
fi(s1, ..., sN) = α
i
1s1 + α
i
2s2 + ...+ α
i
NsN + β
i, for every i = 1, ..., N, (3.1)
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where si ∈ [ai, bi].
Since we search for the optimal response sets of player i, we need to find
strategies si such that maximize a payoff function of player i while the elements
of vector s−i are given parameters. Clearly from expression (3.1), value of strat-
egy si satisfying such condition does not depend on vector s−i anyway. This
means that player i is able to make a choice about his maximizing strategy si
independently of choices of other players. Let us discuss this characteristic prop-
erly in the following.
Let us distinguish 3 cases:
(i) αii > 0.
Hence a payoff function fi is increasing in si. It follows then that the
supremum is reached in only one point si = bi. Thus for every vector s−i it
holds that
Ci(s−i) = {bi}.
(ii) αii < 0.
Hence a payoff function fi is decreasing in si and the supremum is reached
in only one point si = ai. Thus for every vector s−i it holds that
Ci(s−i) = {ai},
(iii) αii = 0.
In this case fi does not depend on si at all and hence the supremum is
reached in any point si ∈ [ai, bi]. Thus for every vector s−i it holds that
Ci(s−i) = [ai, bi],
Analogously we find the optimal response set of all players. We can see that
their values do not depend on strategies and hence it is easy to find their inter-
section points.
Based on the analysis of cases (i) - (ii) we conclude that a vector of strategies
s¯ = (s¯1, . . . , s¯N) is a Nash equilibrium of AL game if for every i = 1, ..., N it holds
that
• s¯i = bi whenever f is increasing in its i-th component.
• s¯i = ai whenever f is decreasing in its i-th component.
• s¯i ∈ [ai, bi] whenever f is constant in its i-th component.
We conclude with several obvious observations. However, let us remind that
we still consider compact set of strategies.
1. There always exists a Nash equilibrium in AL game.
2. There exists only one Nash equilibrium in AL game if and only if the linear
payoff function f = (f1, ..., fN) is not constant in any component.
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3. There exists infinitely many Nash equilibra in AL game if and only if the
linear payoff function f = (f1, ..., fN) is constant in at least one component.
Linear game and its Nash equilibria on compact set of strategies is illustrated
in the following example.
Example 4:
Suppose there are only two countries on the market producing oil. Both
countries have minimum required amount they want to produce. Let us denote
these amounts Mmin1 > 0 for country 1 and M
min
2 > 0 for country 2. Both
countries have also maximum possible amount they are able to produce. Let us
denote these amountsMmax1 > 0 for country 1 andM
max
2 > 0 for country 2, while
it holds that Mmax1 > M
min
1 and M
max
2 > M
min
2 .
The price of oil is determined by the market and countries cannot influence it.
Both countries separately make decision about amount of oil they will produce.
The more the country produces the more its payoff will be, however, since it
decreases demand for oil produced by the other country, it decreases the payoff
of the other country as well.
Let us denote by f1 the payoff function of country 1 and by f2 the payoff
function of country 2. Further let us denote by s1 the amount of oil produced by
country 1 and by s2 the amount of oil produced by country 2.
Hence it holds that
f1(s1, s2) = as1 − bs2,
f2(s1, s2) = as2 − bs1
where s1 ∈ [M
min
1 ,M
max
1 ], s2 ∈ [M
min
2 ,M
max
2 ] and a, b > 0.
Since payoff functions of both countries are increasing in an amount of oil
produced by them, it holds that
C1(s2) = {M
max
1 }, for every s2 ∈ [M
min
2 ,M
max
2 ],
where C1 is the optimal response set of country 1 and
C2(s1) = {M
max
2 }, for every s1 ∈ [M
min
1 ,M
max
1 ],
where C2 is the optimal response set of country 2.
There exists only one intersection point of these sets hence there exists only
one Nash equilibrium in this game which is (Mmax1 ,M
max
2 ).
△
Further, let us consider the set of strategies to be the whole set of real numbers.
B) Suppose that S = RN .
If fi is strictly monotone on S, it does not take its supremum hence the
optimal response set of player i is an empty set. If fi is constant in si, it takes
its supremum in every point si ∈ Si hence it holds that
Ci(s−i) = R.
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Hence we can conclude that there exists a Nash equilibrium in AL game if
and only if fi is constant in si for every i = 1, ..., N . In such case, any point of S
is a Nash equilibrium.
3.2 Piecewise Affine Linear Games
Suppose we have a game of N players, where every player i, i = 1, ..., N , has a
piecewise affine linear continuous payoff function fi(si, s−i) on a nonempty convex
set of strategies S ⊂ RN .
We call such game piecewise affine linear game (PAL game).
As in the case of linear games we distinguish two different types of the set of
strategies in this section as well. Firstly, let us consider a compact set.
A) Suppose S = [a1, b1]× ...× [aN , bN ] ⊂ R
N
+ .
Suppose there exists partition of every interval [ai, bi], i = 1, ..., N , such that
for every i = 1, ..., N there exist points ai = α
i
1 < α
i
2 < ... < α
i
ti
= bi, ti ∈ N, and
that fi is an affine linear function on
Ml = [α
1
l1
, α1l1+1]× [α
2
l2
, α2l2+1]...× [α
N
lN
, αNlN+1],
for every l = (l1, ..., lN) ∈ L, where L is a set of all N -tuples (l1, ..., lN) such that
li ∈ {1, ..., ti − 1} for every i = 1, ..., N .
Clearly,
⋃
l∈LMl = S and hence fi is piecewise affine linear function on S.
If we restrict the set of strategies S on Ml for some l ∈ L, we get a linear
game and from previous section it follows that there exists at least one Nash
equilibrium in such restricted game.
Let us denote by El such sets of Nash equilibria on the sets of strategies Ml
for every l ∈ L.
The following result will help us to identify Nash equilibria in PAL game.
Lemma 4. Let s¯ be a Nash equilibrium of PAL game. Then it holds that
s¯ ∈
⋃
l∈L
El.
Proof. Suppose that s¯ is a Nash equilibrium of PAL game and s¯ /∈
⋃
l∈LEl.
From Definition 8 it follows that
fi(s¯i, s¯−i) = sup
si∈Si
fi(si, s¯−i)
for every i = 1, ..., N .
Since s¯ ∈ S, there exists l ∈ L such that s¯ ∈Ml. Thus
fi(s¯i, s¯−i) = sup
si
{fi(si, s¯−i) | (si, s¯−i) ∈Ml}.
This means that s¯ is a Nash equilibrium on the set of strategies restricted on
Ml, which is a contradiction with s¯ /∈
⋃
l∈LEl. This completes the proof.
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Let us make some other conclusion about PAL game. In the following let us
fix some i ∈ {1, ..., N}. Then by M il we will understand the set
M il :=
[
αili , α
i
li+1
]
×
N
X
j=1
j 6=i
[
αjlj , α
j
lj+1
]
.
Further, by l−i we understand the (N − 1)-tuple (l1, ..., li−1, li+1, ..., lN).
Suppose some interval of strategies [αili , α
i
li+1
] of player i to be fixed. Since
fi is linear function in si ∈ [α
i
li
, αili+1] for every vector s−i and it is continuous
on the whole S, it follows that fi has a same slope in si ∈ [α
i
li
, αili+1] for every
vector s−i. Hence player i can maximize his payoff function fi on this interval
independently of vector of strategies of other players. It means that if there exists
li ∈ {1, ..., ti− 1} such that a function fi(si, s−i) reaches its supremum on the set
M il for some l−i, then it reaches its supremum on M
i
l for every l−i.
Hence we will fix l−i and restrict the set of strategies of all players except of
player i on
S−i :=
N
X
j=1
j 6=i
[
αjlj , α
j
lj+1
]
.
From Theorem A.12 (Weierstrass) it follows that there exists li ∈ {1, ..., ti−1}
such that the payoff function takes its supremum on the set
[
αili , α
i
li+1
]
× S−i.
However, from assumptions about payoff functions it follows that we can find
more than one of such li.
Denote J i the index set of all such li.
For all l = (l1, ..., lN), where li ∈ J
i, i ∈ {1, ..., N}, denote
Hl :=
N
X
i=1
[
αili , α
i
li+1
]
.
Clearly, Hl is the subset of S where payoff functions of all players take their
suprema. Thus if there exists a Nash equilibrium of PAL game, it has to be a
point of Hl. Based on this and the result of Lemma 4 it follows that
⋃
l
(
Hl
⋂
El | l = (l1, ..., lN), li ∈ J
i
)
is a set of all Nash equilibria in PAL game. Since there exists at least one l such
that Hl is nonempty set and El is nonempty for all l, the set of Nash equilibria
contains at least one point.
The computation of Nash equilibria in PAL game is illustrated in the follow-
ing example.
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Example 5:
Kane and Loli usually go jogging from 1 o’clock to 5 o’clock every weekend. It
is Sunday and they agreed to start at 1 o’clock as usually. However, they did not
agree on how long they would be running so they have to decide on their own.
Kane does not feel well today so he would not rather run longer then to 4
o’clock. He would like Loli to join him but after 2 hours of jogging he would be
too tired to care whether Loli still runs with him.
Loli would like to see her favorite TV show from 1 o’clock to 3 o’clock. If
she would go running, her utility from jogging will be decreasing as she will be
missing her TV show. After 3 o’clock her joy from jogging will start to increase.
However, she would like Kane to join her as long as he can.
Let us denote f1 the payoff function of Kane and f2 the payoff function of
Loli. Further, let us denote s1 and s2 the number of hours they will be running.
It holds
f1(s1, s2) =


s1 + s2 for s1 ∈ [0, 3], s2 ∈ [0, 2]
s1 + 2 for s1 ∈ [0, 3], s2 ∈ [2, 4]
−s1 + s2 + 6 for s1 ∈ [3, 4], s2 ∈ [0, 2]
−s1 + 8 for s1 ∈ [3, 4], s2 ∈ [2, 4].
and
f2(s1, s2) =


−s2 + s1 for s1 ∈ [0, 3], s2 ∈ [0, 2]
s2 + s1 − 4 for s1 ∈ [0, 3], s2 ∈ [2, 4]
−s2 + s1 for s1 ∈ [3, 4], s2 ∈ [0, 2]
s2 + s1 − 4 for s1 ∈ [3, 4], s2 ∈ [2, 4].
Both functions are piecewise linear on the set of strategies S = [0, 4] × [0, 4]
and linear on each of the subsets
M1 = [0, 3]× [0, 2]
M2 = [0, 3]× [2, 4]
M3 = [3, 4]× [0, 2]
M4 = [3, 4]× [2, 4].
Using the section 3.1 we find Nash equilibria on each set of strategies Mj, j =
1, .., 4. It holds
E1 = {(3, 0)}
E2 = {(3, 4)}
E3 = {(3, 0)}
E4 = {(3, 4)},
where Ej is a set of Nash equilibria on the set of strategies Mj.
As the next step we fix strategies of one player and find the intervals where
the payoff function of the second player takes its suprema. Kane’s payoff function
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takes its suprema in two intervals - [0, 3] and [3, 4]. In both intervals the supremum
is reached in point 3. For Loli’s payoff function there are two such intervals as
well - [0, 2] and [2, 4]. Her payoff function takes its suprema in points 0 and 4.
Clearly, there are 4 subsets of the set of strategies where Kane’s and Loli’s
payoff functions take their suprema simultaneously. These subsets are identical
to M1, ...,M4. The set of Nash equilibria E can be found as intersection points
of these sets and the correspondent sets E1, ..., E4. This gives us the following
conclusion.
E = {(3, 0), (3, 4)}.
△
In the rest of this section we discuss the PAL game with the set of strategies
represented by the whole set of real numbers.
B) Suppose S = RN .
In this case piecewise affine linear continuous functions do not have to take
their suprema on S and hence there do not have to exist optimal response sets. We
have to put some restrictions on payoff functions. Sufficient additional assumption
is to assume a function −f to be coercive. One of the solvable examples is the
case of concave payoff functions which are not monotone on the whole S. Such
functions take their local maxima on S which are also their global maxima and
hence the optimal response set of each player can be found. The problem of
finding Nash equilibria for concave functions is discussed in the next section.
3.3 Concave games
Suppose a game ofN players where every player i, i = {1, ..., N}, has a continuous
concave payoff function fi(si, s−i) on a nonempty convex set of strategies S.
We call such game concave game (C game).
Firstly, let us consider compact set of strategies.
A) Suppose S = [a1, b1]× ...× [aN , bN ] ⊂ R
N
+ .
As in the previous sections we are interested in the optimal response sets
Ci(s−i) of all players.
There is a useful theorem which describes this sets sufficiently. In the literature
it is called The Maximum Theorem and we will present it later. First, let us give
some definitions useful in the following text.
Definition 10. A mapping P : Rn → R, n ∈ N, which associates with each
element x ∈ Rn a nonempty subset P (x) ⊂ R will be called a set-valued map.
Definition 11. A set-valued map P : x 7→ P (x) is said to be
compact-valued at x if P (x) is a compact set,
convex-valued at x if P (x) is a convex set,
single-valued at x if a set P (x) has just one point.
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Definition 12. A set-valued map P : x 7→ Θ(x) is said to be upper-semicontinuous
(usc) at x ∈ R if for all open sets V such that P (x) ⊂ V , there exists an open
set U containing x, such that for every x′ ∈ U ∩ R it holds P (x′) ⊂ V . We say
that P is usc on R if P is usc at each x ∈ R.
Definition 13. A set-valued map P : x 7→ Θ(x) is said to be lower-semicontinuous
(lsc) at x ∈ R if for all open sets V such that P (x)∩ V 6= ∅, there exists an open
set U containing x, such that for every x′ ∈ U ∩R it holds P (x)∩V 6= ∅. We say
that P is lsc on R if P is lsc at each x ∈ R.
Remark. A set-valued map P : x 7→ P (x) is continuous at x ∈ R if it is both usc
and lsc at x.
Theorem 5 (The Maximum Theorem under Convexity). Suppose f is continuous
function on R×Rn, where n ∈ N and P is a compact-valued continuous set-valued
map on Rn. Let
f ∗(t) = max{f(x, t) | x ∈ P (t)}
P ∗(t) = argmax{f(x, t) | x ∈ P (t)} = {x ∈ P (t) | f(x, t) = f ∗(t)}
where x ∈ R and t ∈ Rn. Then
1. f ∗ is a continuous function on Rn and P ∗ is a usc set-valued map on Rn.
2. If f(x, t) is concave in x for each t and P is convex-valued, then P ∗ is
a convex-valued set-valued map. When ”concave” is replaced by ”strictly
concave”, then P ∗ is a single-valued usc set-valued map, hence a continuous
function.
Proof. Sundaram: A First Course in Optimization Theory (p. 237).
Denote P : s−i ∈ S−i 7→ [ai, bi]. Then P is compact-valued, convex-valued
continuous set-valued map.
From the conclusion 1 of the Maximum Theorem and using also Theorem
A.12 it follows that
• fMi (s−i) = sup{fi(si, s−i) | si ∈ [ai, bi]} = max{fi(si, s−i) | si ∈ [ai, bi]} is a
continuous function on S−i and
• Ci(s−i) = {si ∈ [ai, bi] | fi(si, s−i) = f
M
i (s−i)} is a usc set-valued map on S−i.
Since fi is a concave on S, from the conclusion 2 of the Maximum Theorem
it follows that
• Ci(s−i) is a convex-valued set-valued map.
These properties of optimal response sets of all players are sufficient for prov-
ing the existence of Nash equilibria. Clearly,
C = (C1(s−1), ..., CN(s−N))
is convex-valued and compact-valued as well. It is also nonempty since fi takes
its maximum on Si for all i = 1, ..., N and hence Ci(s−i) has at least one point.
From Theorem 2 (Kakutani’s Fixed Point) then it follows that a mapping C
has a fixed point. Hence there exists a Nash equilibrium in C game.
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Further let us discuss the case of game with strictly concave payoff functions.
According to the conclusion 2 of the Maximum Theorem, Ci(s−i) is a continuous
function. Hence in this case there can be used more common fixed point theorem,
Theorem 1 (Brower’s Fixed Point).
Finally, we can conclude that there exists at least one Nash equilibrium in C
game for both concave and strictly concave payoff functions.
In the next part let us consider the set of strategies to be the whole set of real
numbers.
B) Suppose that S = RN .
If the payoff function is monotone on S, it does not have to take any supre-
mum and when the optimal response sets are empty sets there cannot exist any
Nash equilibrium. However, if the payoff function is not monotone on S, there
exists at least one supremum which is also a maximum and hence the optimal
response sets are nonempty. However, their values are dependent on strategies
of other players and there does not have to exist any intersection point of these
sets.
In the following example we introduce calculating Nash equilibria with con-
cave payoff functions in a common economic model.
Example 6: (Cournot’s model)
Suppose there are two companies producing lamb’s wool. Denote y1 an
amount of wool produced by company 1 and y2 an amount of wool produced
by company 2. Both companies decide about these outputs simultaneously but
separately, so they do not know what amount of wool the other one will choose.
We suppose that the price of lamb’s wool is determined by the market in de-
pendence on produced amount but it is not implicitly influenceable by producers
(companies). In this case we will suppose price to be an affine linear function of
total output:
p = −a(y1 + y2) + b,
where a, b > 0. Let us mention that the price is decreasing when amount of
outputs is increasing.
Both companies want to maximize their profits from produced wool. Clearly,
earnings of company i are p · yi, i = 1, 2. Costs of company i ci, i = 1, 2, are
affine linear functions of amounts of outputs.
ci = kyi + l, i = 1, 2,
where k, l > 0.
Hence payoff functions of companies are as follows
f1(y1, y2) = (−a(y1 + y2) + b) y1 − ky1 − l,
f2(y1, y2) = (−a(y1 + y2) + b) y2 − ky2 − l,
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where y1, y2 ≥ 0.
We will use general conditions for finding extremes:
∂f1(y1, y2)
∂y1
= 0,
∂f2(y1, y2)
∂y2
= 0.
After derivation we get
y1 =
−ay2 + b− k
2a
,
y2 =
−ay1 + b− k
2a
.
Since we calculated the produced amounts maximizing profits as functions of
produced outputs of the other company, we got the reaction curves (the optimal
response sets) of both companies.
Hence we can calculate Nash equilibria as intersection points of these reaction
curves.
−2ay1 − a
−ay1 + b− k
2a
+ b− k = 0,
−a
−ay2 + b− k
2a
− 2ay2 + b− k = 0.
We get
y∗1 =
b− k
3a
,
y∗2 =
b− k
3a
.
A vector (y∗1, y
∗
2) is a Nash equilibrium of both companies.
This game is in the economic theory called Cournot’s model. Equilibrium
in this model is called Cournot equilibrium. We can notice that players reach
this equilibrium only if they expect exact amount of outputs produced by other
players while maximizing their profits.
△
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Chapter 4
Conclusion
In this thesis On the Role of Linearity Assumption in Nash Games we discussed
calculating of Nash equilibria in several types of games. The main analysis was
structured in two parts. In the first part, Chapter 2, we introduced the game
theory and further focused on a concept of Nash equilibria. In the second part,
Chapter 3, we discussed 3 different types of games and analyze an existence and
calculating Nash equilibria in them.
Application of the game theory is widely used in many different disciplines, for
example philosophy, biology and many others. Its still increasing importance also
appears in the economic theory where it is used for modeling common economic
situations. Using the game theory economists can model situations on markets
among economic actors. It helps describe such situations as monopoly, duopoly
or oligopoly. One of the interests of the economic theory is to find equilibrium
points in such economic situations. Since there is an assumption of rationality
of economic actors, there is widely used also concept of Nash equilibria in non-
cooperative situations. To maximize own profit is one of the convenient way how
to get to Nash equilibrium if there exists some. However, we showed in this thesis
that this behavior does not have to lead to the best outcome of the situation, in
words of economists, to the common good. Recall the situation of Prisoner’s
dilemma. Companies in the market often get in similar situations where they
have to choose between to trust to each other and not to betray to keep their
credibility or to expect betrayal and to betray. In the reality it shows that in
morally mature markets companies rather choose to trust and not to betray.
This leads to question of sufficiency and convenience of rationality assumption
for describing real situations on markets. However, it shows that the importance
of other aspects, as morality or trust, instead of pure profit maximization is
indispensable.
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Appendix A
Basic Definitions and Theorems
Definition A.1. (linear function)
Let f : RN → R, N ∈ N, be a real-valued function. We say that f is linear if
f(αx) = αf(x)
f(x+ y) = f(x) + f(y)
for every α ∈ R and x ∈ RN .
Definition A.2. Let g : RN → R, N ∈ N, be a real-valued function. We say
that g is affine linear if there exist linear function f : RN → R and a constant
c ∈ R such that
g(x) = f(x) + c
for all x ∈ RN .
Theorem A.3. Suppose f : RN → R is an affine linear function. Then there
exist coefficients α1, ..., αN , β ∈ R such that
f(x1, . . . , xN) = α1x1 + α2x2 + · · ·+ αNxN + β.
Definition A.4. (piecewise affine linear function)
Let f : RN → R, N ∈ N, be a real-valued function. We say that function f is
piecewise affine linear if there exist subsets of RN , M1, ...,Mk, k ∈ N, mutually
disjoint such that
⋃k
j=1Mj = R
N and f is affine linear on Mj, for every j =
1, . . . , k.
Definition A.5. (convex and strictly convex function)
Let f : RN → R, N ∈ N, be a real-valued function. We say that function f
is convex on RN if for every pair (x1, . . . xN), (x
′
1, . . . x
′
N) ∈ R
N and λ ∈ [0, 1] it
holds
f(λx1 + (1− λ)x
′
1, . . . , λxN + (1− λ)x
′
N)
≤ λf(x1, . . . , xN) + (1− λ)f(x
′
1, . . . x
′
N).
We say that f is strictly convex on RN if for every pair (x1, . . . xN), (x
′
1, . . . x
′
N) ∈
R
N , (x1, . . . xN) 6= (x
′
1, . . . x
′
N), and λ ∈ (0, 1) it holds
f(λx1 + (1− λ)x
′
1, . . . , λxN + (1− λ)x
′
N)
< λf(x1, . . . , xN) + (1− λ)f(x
′
1, . . . x
′
N).
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Definition A.6. (concave and strictly concave function)
We say that f : RN → R, N ∈ N, is (strictly) concave on RN if −f is a (strictly)
convex function.
Definition A.7. (increasing function)
We say that a function f : R→ R is increasing on R if for every pair x1, x2 ∈ R,
x1 < x2, it holds that f(x1) < f(x1).
Remark. Definitions of decreasing, non-increasing and non-decreasing function
are analogous.
Definition A.8. (constant function)
We say that a function f : R→ R is constant on R if f(x) = f(y) for all x, y ∈ R.
Definition A.9. (monotone and strictly monotone function)
We say that a function f : R→ R is monotone (resp. strictly monotone) on R if
it is non-increasing or non-decreasing (resp. increasing or decreasing) on R.
Definition A.10. (coercive function)
Let S be an unbounded set and f : S → R. We say that f is coercive if it holds
that
lim
‖s‖→∞
s∈S
f(s) = +∞.
Definition A.11. (convex set)
The set M ∈ RN , N ∈ N, is called convex if for all x, y ∈ M and λ ∈ [0, 1] it
holds
λx+ (1− λ)y ∈M .
Theorem A.12 (Weierstrass). Let f be a continuous function on a compact in-
terval [a, b], a, b ∈ R, a 6= b. Then there exist a maximum and a minimum of f
on [a, b].
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